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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this Court is proper according to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err when it held that Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Nichols did 
not have the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion when he made a traffic stop of Guy 
Montoya's car? 
In evaluating a trial court's findings of facts underlying a motion to dismiss the 
standard of review is whether the trial court made a "clear error" in its decision. State v. 
Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) Although the Court of Appeals gives some 
"measure of discretion" to the trial court's application of those facts to the law, whether 
or not there is reasonable articulable suspicion for a stop is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. Id. 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
The issues presented for review were preserved by oral argument to the trial court 
as shown by the transcript of the motion hearing. (R. 367, Addendum A pp. 19-20). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-69 is the determinative statute at issue in this case. The text of 
the statute is listed below in its entirety. 
(1) (a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left 
on a roadway or change lanes until the movement can be 
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made with reasonable safety and an appropriate signal has 
been given. 
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to change 
lanes shall be given continuously for at least the last three 
seconds preceding the beginning of the turn or change. 
(2) A person may not stop or suddenly decrease the speed 
of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal to the 
operator of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is 
opportunity to give a signal. 
(3) The signals required on vehicles by Section 41-6-70 
may not be flashed on one side only on a disabled vehicle, 
flashed as a courtesy or "do pass" to operators of other 
vehicles approaching from the rear, or flashed on one side 
only of a parked vehicle except as necessary to comply with 
this section. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
On October 31, 2003 at about 11:03 p.m. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Mark 
Nichols made a traffic stop of the car driven by the Defendant/Appellee, Guy Montoya, at 
approximately 938 South Washington Street in Salt Lake City. (R. 367, Addendum A p. 
4.) The reason Trooper Nichols made the stop of Mr. Montoya's car was that he saw Mr. 
Montoya move out of the regular lane of travel and pull over to the curb without 
signaling. (Id. at p. 5.) 
Mr. Montoya was charged in the Salt Lake City Justice Court with Count 1 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs in violation of U.C.A. §41-6-44 and 
Count 2 Failure to Signal in violation of U.C.A. §41-6-69. (R. 1). Mr. Montoya moved to 
suppress evidence in the justice court (R. 45-50), an evidentiary hearing was held, and the 
court denied the motion to suppress. (R. 51-58). Mr. Montoya was convicted of both 
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counts after a jury trial in the justice court. (R. 129-132). Mr. Montoya subsequently 
appealed the conviction to the Third District Court. (R. 275-280). 
At the Third District Court Mr. Montoya again moved to suppress evidence. (R. 
347-353) After an evidentiary hearing and legal argument, the trial court found that 
U.C.A. §41-6-69 was ambiguous (R. 367, Addendum A p. 23), and that there was no 
evidence of impairment or any other reason to pull Mr. Montoya over and granted the 
motion to suppress all evidence arising out of the stop. (Id.) After the motion hearing the 
court apparently made a sua sponte motion to dismiss, because although there was no 
motion made by either side, the Court's minute entry indicates that the case was 
dismissed. (R. 358-359, Addendum B p. 7) The case is now before this Court on the 
City's appeal of the trial court's decision. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Trooper Nichols made a valid traffic stop of Mr. Montoya's car when he stopped 
him for failing to signal before leaving his travel lane to move to the curb to park. Mr. 
Montoya's actions violated the plain language of U.C.A. §41-6-69 which requires a driver 
to signal before moving right or left upon a roadway. Additionally, despite the trial 
court's decision that the statute is ambiguous, Trooper Nichols did rely on and was 
entitled to rely on the plain language of the statute in effect at the time. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT TROOPER NICHOLS DID 
NOT HAVE REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO STOP 
MR. MONTOYA WAS AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF LAW. 
"A police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is 
incident to a traffic violation committed in the officers' presence." State v Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). Pursuant to the Utah Traffic Code in effect at the time of 
the stop, "a person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left on a roadway or change 
lanes until.. .an appropriate signal has been given as provided under this section." Utah 
Code Ann. §41-6-69 (emphasis added). The Traffic Code defines the "roadway" as the 
"portion of highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel." Utah 
Code Ann. §41-6-1(41). 
In State v. Preece, the Court held where the trooper saw the defendant pull off to the 
right side of the road and then reenter without using a turn signal, that the trooper "had 
probable cause—more than the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion—to stop 
Preece." 971 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The Court found that the stop did not 
violate the defendants Fourth Amendment rights. Id. Preece's action of leaving the lane 
of travel to pull to the right side of the road was defined by the Court as "movfing] right 
or left upon a roadway or changing] lanes." Id. 
The Federal Court of Appeals referring to the two statues above stated, "although the 
government argues that merging is the only possible application of the 'move right or left' 
7 
portion of the statute, other applications are possible. A vehicle may pull off the roadway 
onto the shoulder.. .this situation also involves a 'move right or left' where the statute 
would apply and requires signaling." U.S. v. Gregorie, 425 F.3d 872, 878 (10th Cir. Utah 
2005). 
In a similar case, US. v. Parker, the Highway Patrol Trooper observed a vehicle move 
from the travel lane into the emergency lane without the use of a turn-signal. 72 F.3d 
1444, 1449 (10th Cir Utah 1995). The Court found that the Trooper had witnessed a 
traffic violation and could make a constitutionally valid stop. The Court supported the 
traffic violation by applying § 41-6-69(l)(a) which states "A person may not turn a 
vehicle or move right or left upon a roadway or change lanes until... an appropriate signal 
has been given." (Repealed and renumbered as §41-6a-804). The court went on to state 
that, "[i]t is irrelevant whether: (1) the stop in question is sufficiently ordinary or routine 
according to the general practice of the police department or the particular officer making 
the stop; and (2) the officer may have had other subjective motives for stopping the 
vehicle." Parker, 72 F.3d at 1449. 
In this case Mr. Montoya left the roadway without signaling and pulled to the right 
onto the shoulder to park his vehicle. (R. 367, Addendum A at page 5.) This required him 
to move his vehicle from the roadway and a, unmarked lane of travel to the shoulder of 
the road which is outside the lane of travel. (Id.) This move to the right without signaling 
violates the statute according to the Court in Gregorie, 425 F.3d at 878, and is very 
similar to the facts found in Preece to be a violation of law. 971 P.2d at 5. According to 
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the plain reading of the statute when Mr. Montoya changed or moved his vehicle from the 
lane of travel onto the far right shoulder in order to park at the curb, the ordinance 
requires he use his signal. 
Instead of making an analysis of whether Mr. Montoya's driving constituted a 
violation of the applicable statute, the trial court made a cursory finding that the statute 
was ambiguous and subsequently declined to do any further analysis with regard to 
whether or not Montoya's conduct was a violation of law. (R. 367, Addendum A p. 23.) 
Because of the court's expressed belief that the statute is "ambiguous" and by implication 
therefore unconstitutional, the court subsequently ignored the question of whether the 
trooper had witnessed a violation of law. (Id.) Instead the trial court turned its attention to 
whether or not Mr. Montoya was impaired or had "impaired anybody" else with his 
driving. (Id.) The trial court was apparently persuaded that the trooper was enforcing the 
law too vigorously because it suggested that perhaps if this occurred on State Street there 
would be a violation but not on a quiet residential street where it does not impair anyone. 
(Id.) This analysis is improper. The traffic code applies whether a driver is on a high 
traffic roadway such as State Street or on a "quiet residential street." The statute 
requiring a signal does not say that the signal is only a requirement when the movement 
may impede another driver. 
Because Trooper Nichols witnessed Mr. Montoya drive his car in a way that violated 
the plain meaning of the law, he was constitutionally permitted to make a stop of Mr. 
Montoya. The trial court's belief that the law was ambiguous and unconstitutional which 
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led to its failure to apply the law to the facts of the case was erroneous and should be 
reversed. 
II. BECAUSE TROOPER NICHOLS RELIED IN GOOD FAITH ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UTAH CODE § 41-6-69, EVIDENCE 
GATHERED FROM THE TRAFFIC STOP OF MR. MONTOYA SHOULD 
NOT BE SUPPRESSED. 
There is no dispute that Mr. Montoya failed to use his vehicle's turn signal or to 
make any other appropriate signal to indicate that he was pulling to the side of the road to 
park. Trooper Nichols initiated a traffic stop based on his observation of a violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-69 which states: "A person may not turn a vehicle or move right 
or left on a roadway or change lanes until the movement can be made with reasonable 
safety; and an appropriate signal has been given under this section." Notwithstanding the 
lower court's finding that § 41-6-69 is ambiguous and therefore unconstitutional, the 
traffic stop in the instant case is lawful because Trooper Nichols relied on the statute in 
good faith. 
A. A stop or arrest made pursuant to a law enforcement officer's good faith 
reliance on a statute not yet declared unconstitutional is valid, regardless 
of a subsequent judicial determination of its constitutionality. 
The traffic stop in the instant case is valid in that Utah Code § 41-6-69 is not 
clearly unconstitutional, and therefore, Trooper Nichols "cannot be expected to question 
the judgment of the legislature that passed the law." Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-
50 (1987) ("Unless a statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be expected to 
question the judgment of the legislature that passed the law."); see also United States v. 
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Vanness, 342 F.3d 1093, 1098 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that "'a law enforcement officer' 
could have 'acted in good-faith reliance upon" the 'Unreasonable Noise' ordinance 
because 'its provisions are such that a reasonable officer' would not have 'known that the 
statute was unconstitutional.'") 
In Illinois v. Krull the defendants were arrested and charged with various criminal 
violations of Illinois' motor vehicle statutes after a police detective discovered that 
several vehicles in the wrecking yard were stolen. 480 U.S. at 343-44. The defendants 
moved to suppress the seized evidence arguing that the Illinois statute that allowed the 
detective unbridled discretion in their searches was unconstitutional. Id. at 344. 
The United States Supreme Court in Krull reversed the Illinois Supreme Court 
ruling granting the defendant's motion to suppression. The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence obtained by police 
who acted in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute authorizing the warrantless 
search, but which was subsequently found to violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 349-
355; see also Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40 (1979) ("The subsequently 
determined invalidity of the Detroit ordinance on vagueness grounds does not undermine 
the validity of the arrest made for violation of that ordinance, and the evidence discovered 
in the search of respondent should not have been suppressed.") The Krull Court noted 
that the statute was not clearly unconstitutional and, therefore, the detective was not 
expected to question the judgment of the legislature that passed the law. Id. at 358-359. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this same issue in State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 
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446, 452 (Utah 1995), holding that bi[aJ stop or arrest made pursuant to an officer's good 
faith reliance on an ordinance not yet declared unconstitutional is valid, regardless of a 
subsequent judicial determination of its unconstitutionality." See also Utah v. Lambeth, 
2005 UT App 289 (June 23, 2005) (unpublished opinion) ("[A]n officer acts in good faith 
merely by applying the statute as written, unless the statute is 'so grossly and flagrantly 
unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its 
flaws.5") In Chapman, the defendant was arrested for violating a Salt Lake County 
loitering ordinance and was subsequently charged with one count of burglary and two 
counts of theft. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered after his 
initial detention arguing the constitutionality of the County ordinance. The trial court 
denied the defendant's motion. On appeal, this Court did not reach the issue of the 
constitutionality of the loitering ordinance, but found that the officers could reasonably 
rely on the ordinance because it had not yet been declared unconstitutional. 
The defendant argued on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court that the ordinance was 
unconstitutional and its unconstitutionality should have been obvious to the officers, 
therefore the officers could not properly rely on it to detain him. The Utah Supreme 
Court ruled, however, that 
[p]olice are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are declared 
unconstitutional. The enactment of a law forecloses speculation by 
enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality—with the possible 
exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person 
of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws. 
Id. at 451-452. 
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In the present case, Trooper Nichol's initial contact with Mr. Montoya was 
justified. Trooper Nichols conducted a traffic stop on Mr. Montoya based on a violation 
of a section of the Utah Code which was valid at the time of the stop. The state trooper 
was acting in good faith by applying § 41-6-69 as written, and the statute is not %tso 
grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be 
bound to see its flaws." Lambeth, 2005 UT App 289 *3-4; quoting DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 
31,38. Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that Trooper Nichols had any 
knowledge that this statute was or had been declared unconstitutional. 
Thus, even though §41-6-69 was found by the trial court to be ambiguous, the 
traffic stop and subsequent arrest in this case are valid based on Trooper Nichol's good 
faith reliance on the statute. As the Utah Supreme Court has held, "a stop or arrest made 
pursuant to an officer's good faith reliance on an ordinance not yet declared 
unconstitutional is valid, regardless of a subsequent judicial determination of its 
constitutionality." Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452. 
CONCLUSION 
Trooper Nichols had the necessary reasonable articulable suspicion to make a 
traffic stop of Mr. Montoya's car when he stopped him for failing to signal before leaving 
his travel lane to move to the curb to park. Mr. Montoya's actions violated the plain 
language of §41-6-69 which requires a driver to signal before moving right or left upon a 
roadway. Additionally, despite the trial court's decision that the statute is ambiguous, 
Trooper Nichols did rely on and was entitled to rely on the plain language of the statute in 
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effect at the time. Therefore the decision of the trial court suppressing evidence and 
dismissing the case should be reversed and the case should be reinstated and remanded 
for further proceedings. 
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calls 
Trooper Mark Nichols. 
THE COURT: Will you come forward and be sworn. 
COURT CLERK: Okay, will you raise your right hand. Do 
you affirm that the testimony you shall give in this case shall 
be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, under 
the pains and penalties of perjury? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
COURT CLERK: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right, if you'd take the stand, please. 
Make yourself comfortable. 
MR. FLATER: Just preliminarily, your Honor, for 
the benefit of guiding this testimony a little bit, as I 
understand the motion we're looking at the stop and the 
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THE COURT: Probable cause to the initial stop, 
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right? 
MR. ARCHULETA: That is correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, all right. 
MARK NICHOLS, 
having been first duly sworn, 
testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FLATER: 
Q. Trooper Nichols, would you please state your full name 
and experience for the Court? 
A. Mark Nichols. I'm a Sergeant with Utah Highway 
Patrol. I've been on the Highway Patrol for nine years now. 
Q. Okay, 
that evening? 
A. I was 
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- 5 -
1 I Q. Can you tell me what you observed at that location? 
2 I A. Yes. I observed a pick-up truck that did not use his 
3 signal when he pulled to the side of the road. 
4 Q. Okay. Now, is that the first time that you'd seen 
5 that pick-up truck at that location? 
6 A. I had — no, excuse me. I had seen the pick-up truck 
7 two to three blocks prior to where the pick-up truck actually 
8 pulled over to the side of the road. 
9 Q. Okay, and when you describe pulling over to the side 
10 of the road, can you describe that in more detail for the 
11 Court? 
12 A. Yes. As the pick-up truck was driving down Washington 
13 Street, he then moved over to the curb as to park. There was 
14 other — other place — or other cars parked, and there was a 
15 spot for him to park. He moved from the travel lane to the 
16 right, and parked alongside the curb. 
17 Q. And how far behind him were you at the time when he 
18 made that maneuver? 
19 A. Oh, I would say 50 feet — 50-plus feet. 
20 Q. Okay, and once again, your reason for stopping him was 
21 what? 
22 A. He actually stopped before I activated my lights; and 
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1 THE COURT: It's 804, okay. 
2 MR. FLATER: Oh, 804. Okay. 
3 THE COURT: All right, I have it. You can go ahead. 
4 You can keep going. 
5 MR. FLATER: Okay. With my understanding of what we're 
6 here for today, your Honor, I believe that the facts leading up 
7 to the stop have been, I guess, sufficiently established by the 
8 City. I don't have any other further questions regarding that 
9 issue right now. 
10 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Cross examination — 
11 MR. ARCHULETA: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: — Mr. Archuleta. 
13 MR. ARCHULETA: Thank you. 
14 CROSS EXAMINATION 
15 BY MR. ARCHULETA: 
16 Q. Yes. Trooper Nichols, I wonder if you'd tell me what 
17 your badge number is? 
18 A. My badge number currently? 
19 Q. Yeah, yeah. 
20 A. It's 254. 
21 Q. Was it different back in October 31st of 2003? 
22 A. It was. 
23 Q. What was the number then, if you recall? 
24 A. We've changed a couple — 
25 Q. It may be on your citation. 
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then. 
state 
were 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay, and i t would be f a i r t o say t h a t you 've taken 
t r a i n i n g t o f ind f a c t s t h a t would suggest an i n d i v i d u a l i s 
d r i v i n g impaired? 
A. As — 
Q. As part of your training? 
A. As part of my training as a police officer, yes. 
Q. Okay. Now, on this particular night — correct me if 
I'm wrong — at 8th — 8th South runs east and west? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay, and Washington runs north and south. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Washington — would it be fair to characterize that as 
a small older residential street? 
A. It is a residential street? Whatever you consider 
small, it is a --
Q. Older homes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. There's no divided line between the left and 
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lane — 
Correct. 
— on that street? So it's just a residential street? 
Correct. 
Now, on this particular night when you saw the vehicle 
you weren't actually parked at a location; were you not? 
A. I d o n ' t r e c a l l i f I was parked or d r i v i n g . 
Q. Okay, and you d o n ' t have any r e c o l l e c t i o n of ever 
t e s t i f y i n g t h a t you were parked? 
A. I d o n ' t . 
Q. Do you have any recollection of ever stating that you 
saw him approximately on 400 West, is when you commenced to 
follow him? Would that sound --
A. That's when I first noted that I saw the vehicle, yes. 
Q. Okay, and he was driving an older truck? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Didn't your report indicate that that was an '8 9, I 
believe 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
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you never did discover an 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Equipment-wise, no. 
Q. Okay, and there was — 
equipment violation, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay, never cited for one? 
A. Right. 
Q. When you first observed that vehicle, your police 
report doesn't indicate that that vehicle was speeding, going 
over or under the speed limit in a way that was unsafe for 
other drivers? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
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training. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I guess that's subject to the officer receiving the 
training. 
Q. Okay. Well, did you (inaudible) driving in terms of 
vehicle detection such as weaving, things like that, that may 
suggest he was an impaired driver? 
A. Yes, I have seen those. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Those training manuals. 
Q. So now correct me if I'm wrong, he turned right onto 
Washington Street from 800 South? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. In that regard your report doesn't indicate 
anywhere that there was a turning violation, does it? 
A. Correct. 
Q. 
presume 
So in regard to 
that he signaled 
right-hand turn? 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
Now, in regard t 
an impaired driver would 
A. 
Q. 
it? 
That could be an 
Okay, and that's 
the turn, 
for three 
then, would 
seconds and 
o turns generally, one 
be a wide radius turn; 
indication. 
it be 
made a 
fair to 
lawful 
indication of 
would 
nowhere on your DUI report 
it not? 
form is 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
-12-
A. Correct. 
Q. Does your report (inaudible) that in terms of other 
signs, for example, that he may have straddled a lane or center 
lane in terms of his travel? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay. Nowhere indicates that he hit a lane mark or 
anything like that to suggest he was impaired? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Does it indicate in terms of erratic driving that he 
may have almost hit another vehicle? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Indicate anywhere that he was weaving as you 
were traveling down the road? 
A. 
Q-
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
didn't 
indicat 
lane? 
A. 
No. 
Would you answer "no," or "yes" or "no," I'm sorry. 
I said, "No." 
Okay. 
I'm sorry. 
Okay, and I'm sorry. 
I'11 speak up. 
I apprec — yeah, thank you. I'll apologize. I 
mean to be pushy on that, by the way. Does your report 
e that he was traveling in other than his designated 
No. 
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1 Q. Okay. So there was no evidence of swerving or abrupt 
2 turning movements? 
3 A. Correct. 
4 Q. Okay, no indication he was traveling lower than a 
5 lawful speed limit? 
6 A. Correct. 
7 Q. What drew your attention — lets go back to where you 
8 first saw him. What drew your attention, then, in terms of 
9 factors that you can tell this Court, articulable suspicion 
10 that he was — that Mr. Montoya was an impaired driver? 
11 Now, I'm not talking about the turn when he pulled 
12 onto Washington. I'm talking about the point prior to that, 
13 when you first saw him and made a decision. It's the decision 
14 point. Tell me why you made the decision to follow this 
15 vehicle? 
16 A. It was a vehicle in my area, and I decided to follow 
17 it. 
18 Q. Okay. 
19 A. There was no --
20 Q. No reason? 
21 A. No articuable suspection that he was under the 
22 influence at the time that I turned. 
23 Q. Okay. So could have been Judge Fuchs, then, and you 
24 would have followed his vehicle, as well as anyone else? 
25 A. Yes, sir. 
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1 Q. Do you customarily do that, just follow vehicles until 
2 there's a traffic violation? 
3 A. In this case, two blocks, yes. 
4 Q. Okay, and so would it be your custom to follow a 
5 vehicle until there is traffic violation and make a stop? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Was there any particular reason you made the decision 
8 to follow him down a quiet residential street? 
9 A. No particular reason. 
10 Q. Okay. Now, after we have the vehicle in motion, 
11 sometimes the officer's trained to see how the stop was made. 
12 In other words, an abrupt stop, something that suggests that 
13 there's a problem here. Does your report indicate that there 
14 was any abrupt stopping motion? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. No indication that the stopping what herky jerky, 
17 you know, kind of like sometimes people stop a car that are 
18 inexperienced or impaired? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. So there was no information on the report that he was 
21 any danger to any pedestrian or any other driver this night? 
22 A. Correct. 
23 Q. Okay. Now — oh, here we go. If you just give me a 
2 4 moment, I'm looking for something. 
25 A. Okay. 
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Q. You're aware t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l , in order to become a 
l i c e n s e d d r i v e r , has to take a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e t e s t ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay, and the Drivers License Division makes available 
to the public a Driver's Handbook? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would it be fair to say that most individuals — I 
believe all, well, including myself -- have to study that in 
order to pass that examination? 
A. To a certain point yes. 
Q. Okay. Now, I wonder if you would identify this 
document. You'll have to look on the first page of this and 
tell me what that indicates that is, if you would? 
MR. ARCHULETA: Judge, I have a copy for you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
material 
about --
MR. FLATER: Your Honor, I object to the use of this 
inasmuch as it's — 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
MR. FLATER: — not controlling. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
MR. FLATER: Okay. 
THE COURT: I know what the law is. Just go ahead. 
MR. ARCHULETA: Yeah, if I may ask him some questions 
THE COURT: You may. 
. _J 
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1 Q. BY MR. ARCHULETA: Okay. Now, would you identify this 
2 document please? 
3 A. It says, "Utah Driver Handbook, July 2003." 
4 Q. Okay. Now, I wonder if you would read this. It has, 
5 looks like, five Roman Numeral in turns and signaling. I 
6 wonder if you would read that, what it instructs people they're 
7 required to do. 
8 A. Sure. It says, "Signaling." Do you want me to read 
9 the whole thing? 
10 Q. Please. 
11 A. Okay. "Signaling shall be given by the use of turn 
12 signals, stops — stop lights, or your hand and arm. Good 
13 drivers always use signal, always signal their intentions well 
14 in advance. Signals are required for three seconds before 
15 turning — " 
16 Q. Excuse me at that point; and that's exactly where you 
17 said three seconds — 
18 A. Correct. 
19 Q. -~ and that he gave the three-second turn turning onto 
20 Washington Street, correct? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Please go on. 
23 A. For three seconds before beginning any lane change. 
2 4 Q. Okay. This was beginning any lane change. Now, were 
25 there any marked lanes on Washington Street? 
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1 A. There were no markings on the road. 
2 Q. Okay, please go on. 
3 A. — "anytime you pull away from a curb." 
4 Q. Okay, does it — now, pull away from a curb, presuming 
5 would we — would that mean that if I -- my car was parked, and 
6 I pulled away from the curb, then I'd be required to give a 
7 signal? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. So other people could know. Okay, tell if anywhere 
10 in there it indicates that also that a driver is required to 
11 signal prior to pull over to a curb? 
12 A. I could relate that to No. 2. 
13 Q Would you, please. Tell me what it says. 
14 A. For three seconds before beginning any lane change. 
15 Q. Okay, but m terms of curb, though, it doesn't say — 
16 it says "pulling away from curb;" doesn't say pulling over to 
17 curb? 
18 A. No. 2 does not. 
19 Q. Okay. 
20 A. No. 3 does, but No. 2 says beginning — 
21 Q. Your testimony was is that he did not turn or change 
22 lane. You indicated that he moved over to park his car on the 
23 curb; isn't that correct? 
24 A. Correct. I testified that he moved from his — the 
25 travel lane, out of the travel lane, changed to the parking 
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"move," 
A. Correct. Yeah, yeah. 
Q. Okay, and so that would be fair that he moved his 
vehicle, because a turn, would it not, mean going around a 
radius of some type? 
A. It could mean that, yes. 
Q. Okay. 
MR. ARCHULETA: Your Honor, I suppose in regards to 
just the articulable suspicion whether it was a turn violation, 
this is probably as far as I can go on this. We spoke of that. 
Actually, your Honor, I prepared a lengthy memorandum 
arguing that the statute was ambiguous or vague. It's because 
there's really a number of sections; and m terms of plain 
reading, we felt it was ambiguous and perhaps unconstitutional. 
I got here early, and the City indicated they would 
move to dismiss. Now, even if the Court was to dismiss the 
turn violation, there still is the question whether there was 
articulable suspicion for a traffic violation; but m that 
context I'm prepared to submit the matter to the Court. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
MR. ARCHULETA: Your Honor, if I could make a few 
closing arguments, perhaps? 
THE COURT: Yeah, let me see if there's any --
-19-
1 MR. ARCHULETA: I have no further questions. Thank 
2 you. 
3 THE COURT: — redirect from the City? 
4 MR. FLATER: Your Honor, I don't have anything else. 
5 THE COURT: All right. You may step down. 
6 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
7 THE COURT: Okay, argument from the City'? 
8 MR. FLATER: Yes, your Honor. A lot of the questioning 
9 from the defense Counsel went to whether he had a reasonable 
10 articulable suspicion that the driver was impaired; and he 
11 never testified that he was impaired. In fac,t he testified 
12 the sole reason was — sole reason he stopped him was because 
13 he observed a traffic violation, which was the defendant pulled 
14 out of a lane of travel and parked his car along the curb. 
15 The plain language and the plain reading of the 
16 statute specifically says that a person may not turn a vehicle, 
17 or move right or left upon a road way, or change lanes until 
18 the movement can be made with reasonable safety. 
19 I think the language we need to focus on is the "or 
20 move right or left upon a roadway." He's acknowledged that 
21 this isn't a turn, and didn't consider it a turn; but did 
22 consider it a movement upon the roadway. The statute requires 
23 that a signal be given for that type of movement. 
24 Because there wasn't a signal given, the officer 
25 observed a traffic violation occur m his presence. Therefore 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
-20-
it was proper for him to stop the vehicle. One side note with 
regards to the driver's license — driver's license manual. It 
indicates in there that the — when pulling away from a curb, 
that a signal must be given. 
When you read that in conjunction with the statute, 
the statute never says specifically pulling away from a curb 
you have to give a signal. In fact, the statute supports what 
the driver's license book says by saying "moving right or left 
upon a roadway." 
Typically pulling away from a curb is a movement right 
upon the road way — excuse me, movement left upon the roadway; 
and pulling your car to the curb is a movement left upon the 
roadway. Regardless of what that manual says, the statute is 
what controls. It's very clear, and according to the plain 
language of 
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1 moving your car to the left or right on a roadway takes on 
2 certain ludicrous proportions, is because I don't think any of 
3 us had the experience where we've seen vehicles driving down 
4 the freeway and they actually move to the left or to the right, 
5 and probably no more than what he described about moving his 
6 vehicle to the curb. 
7 I have yet to ever see a vehicle signal when — or 
8 myself when I'm moving down the roadway. Now, changing lanes 
9 is a completely different issue, but vehicles are weaving all 
10 over the place in terms of (inaudible). You don't see signals 
11 made in that situation. What I'm saying is, is that hypothetic 
12 can be extended to some ludicrous statements, as I believe I've 
13 made. 
14 In my motion -- I haven't found a case yet that 
15 defines what a turn is; and I looked and looked to see if I 
16 could find something. So I made reference to — I believe the 
17 Oxford dictionary, or a good dictionary define what a turn is. 
18 A turn really is when you make a turn around an axis. 
19 His own language was "moved his vehicle to the right." 
20 The training handbook rightfully describes really what drivers 
21 are required to do. When they leave a curb, they have to 
22 signal. It doesn't say that in — Counsel tried to drive it 
23 in context of pulling to the side of the road that this a 
2 4 movement that requires a signal. 
25 This is a very, very quiet residential street. His 
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1 vehicle was stopped right at the he turned on his lights, so 
2 it didn't even impair the safety of the officer. He simply 
3 was fishing for any excuse to investigate Mr. Montoya, really 
4 without probable cause up to that point. T 
5 The question was does this constitute articulable 
6 suspicion, and was it a violation under the law? I really 
7 don't think it was. I know that we battled this before Judge 
8 Iwasaki. His reasoning somewhat supported what Counsel said, 
9 and I disagreed with it. I also felt that the statute was 
10 ambiguous. 
11 I prepared about a 12-page brief, came in, was 
12 prepared to give to the Courts — give it to the Attorney 
13 General, have the Court take a look at it. The City said, 
14 "Let's dismiss the turn violation. We will address the DUI," 
15 which is really a whole separate issue. They did a blood draw. 
16 He was slightly over point —0.8. There may be some issues 
17 there that I can address at trial, but for purposes of this, 
18 that's where I stand, your Honor; and I appreciate your 
19 attention. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you. I haven't had a chance to read 
21 the briefs; and I understand Mr. Archuleta that what you do and 
22 I do as driving don't necessarily make it right or wrong --
23 MR. ARCHULETA: Correct. 
24 THE COURT: — because we don't signal when we pull 
25 over; but the Court finds that the officer is in a DUI 
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1 enforcement mode. He worked for a special task force at the 
2 time this occurred. This is a small, private residential 
3 street. I've heard no evidence that this driver impaired 
4 anybody in any way, or any shape or form. 
5 I don't think that the normal practice — and this 
6 is conjecture on the Court's part, but I've yet to ever see a 
7 case m 20 years where any officer has ever pulled anybody for 
8 refusing to use a turn signal on a private side street m the 
9 City. It would be one thing if it was State Street and the 
10 individual was trying to park and impeding traffic, but m 
11 this particular case I've heard nothing that this driver was 
12 impaired or any probable cause to the stop, other than the turn 
13 signal. 
14 I think it's interesting the City's willing to dismiss 
15 the turn signal charge and just go on the DUI. I find the 
16 statute to be ambiguous. I find his movements not to be 
17 unsafe. I find no other evidence of any impairment; and I'm 
18 going to grant the motion to suppress. 
19 I think the officer's doing a good job; but this, 
20 I think, might carry it just a little too far on a private 
21 residential street, where it doesn't impair anybody, and the 
22 individual pulls over to park his car. I have yet to see 
23 anybody in this entire State put on their turn signal to do 
24 that. 
25 If that's the law, then that may be the law and the 
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1 I City can appeal it; but I agree with defense Counsel. I find 
2 no probable cause for this stop whatsoever; and I'm going to 
3 grant you motion to suppress. 
4 MR. ARCHULETA: Thank you, Judge. 
5 THE COURT: You're welcome. 
6 (Hearing concluded) 
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Clerk: cheril 
Prosecutor: VEERU-COLLINGS, PADMA 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROBERT M ARCHULETA 
Video 
Tape Number: Video Tape Count: 8:55 
Defense counsel present motioning the court to set this matter for 
a Motion to Suppress Hearing. Defense counsel will supplement the 
motion already filed. Defense to have supplemental motion filed by 
1-18-06 and the city to have response filed by 
1-31-06. 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 01/31/2006 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W3 7 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: PAUL G MAUGHAN 
01-04-06 Filed: Demand for Jury Trial (URCrP 17 (d) 
01-27-06 Filed: Notice to Attorney General Constitutionality of A State 
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CASE NUMBER 055900311 Misdemeanor DUI 
Statute Has Been Raised & Notice of Right to Intervene 
01-31-06 Charge 1 Disposition is Remanded 
01-31-06 Charge 2 Disposition is Remanded 
01-31-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE 
Judge: PAUL G MAUGHAN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cheril 
Prosecutor: VEERU-COLLINGS, PADMA 
Defendant not present 
Video 
Tape Number: Video Tape Count: 10:47 
Based on the defendant and defense counsel not appearing for todays 
hearing, court orders the appeal dismissed and remanded back to 
Justice Court. 
02-09-06 Note: INCOURT NOTE minutes modified. 
02-09-06 Case Closed 
Disposition Judge is DENNIS M FUCHS 
02-09-06 Note: Clerk mailed contents of file to the Salt Lake City 
Justice Court. 
02-22-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.75 
02-22-06 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.75 
03-16-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.25 
03-16-06 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.25 
03-22-06 Filed: Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Appeal from Justice 
Court (URCrp 39 (g) (1) & (URCP Rule 60 (b) (1) ) (Order not 
attached) 
03-30-06 Filed: Letter from the defendant 
03-30-06 Filed: Letter from the deft 
04-11-06 Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY 
Judge: PAUL G MAUGHAN 
Clerk: cheril 
The court finds good cause to reinstate the defendant's appeal and 
based on there being no objection to defense motion by the city, 
the court grants defense motion to reinstate his appeal. 
Judge PAUL G MAUGHAN 
04-11-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 055900311 ID 6590035 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 04/25/2006 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W37 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
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CASE NUMBER 055900311 Misdemeanor DUI 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: PAUL G MAUGHAN 
04-11-06 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on April 25, 2006 at 09:00 AM in 
Third Floor - W37 with Judge MAUGHAN. 
04-11-06 Note: Based on the appeal in this case being reinstated, clerk 
spoke with Marian at the Salt Lake City Justice Court and she 
is going to send file back to Third District. 
04-13-06 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE rescheduled on May 22, 2006 at 01:30 PM 
Reason: Conflict in attorney schedule. 
04-13-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 055900311 ID 6593168 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE. 
Date: 05/22/2006 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W37 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: PAUL G MAUGHAN 
The reason for the change is Conflict in attorney schedule 
04-13-06 Note: Clerk received a call from Mr. Archuleta's Office, 
advising the court that he has a conflict with hearing date set 
on 4-25-06 @ 9:00. Clerk scheduled new date and told them to 
advise the deft of date. Clerk sent the city notice of change. 
04-14-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 2.25 
04-14-06 COPY FEE Payment Received: 2.25 
Note: 3.00 cash tendered. 0.75 change given. 
05-01-06 Filed: Defendant's First Supplemental Request for Discovery 
(URCrimP Rule 16 (a) (5)) 
05-22-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE 
Judge: PAUL G MAUGHAN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cyndiac 
Prosecutor: FLATER, AARON W 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROBERT M ARCHULETA 
Video 
Tape Number: Video Tape Count: 2:09 
Defense counsel present, requesting a Motion to Suppress hearing. 
MOTION HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 06/22/2006 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W37 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
45 0 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: PAUL G MAUGHAN 
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CASE NUMBER 055900311 Misdemeanor DUI 
05-22-06 Filed: Motion to Suppress Evidence 
05-23-06 MOTION HEARING scheduled on June 22, 2006 at 01:30 PM in Third 
Floor - W37 with Judge MAUGHAN. 
06-22-06 SCHEDULING CONF scheduled on July 13, 2006 at 08:30 AM in 
Fourth Floor - W45 with Judge FUCHS. 
06-22-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE 
Judge: PAUL G MAUGHAN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cyndiac 
Prosecutor: FLATER, AARON W 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROBERT M ARCHULETA 
Video 
Tape Number: Video Tape Count: 1:43 
Defense counsel present, advising the Court that he is ready to go 
forward today, but the City's witness is not present. City motion 
to continue. Defense counsel stipulates to continuance. Based on 
no objection, motion granted. Matter referred to 
Judge Fuchs for scheduling. 
SCHEDULING CONF is scheduled. 
Date: 07/13/2006 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W4 5 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
07-01-06 Judge FUCHS assigned. 
07-13-06 MOTION SUPPRESS scheduled on August 10, 2006 at 01:30 PM in 
Fourth Floor - W45 with Judge FUCHS. 
07-13-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
PRESENT 
C1e rk: wendypg 
Prosecutor: FLATER, AARON W 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J 
Video 
Tape Number: CD 42 Tape Count: 9-05-05 
HEARING 
Defendant appeared before the court for a scheduling conference. 
This is an appeal from Justice Court. Counsel requests Motion 
Suppress Hearing. 
MOTION SUPPRESS is scheduled. 
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CASE NUMBER 055900311 Misdemeanor DUI 
Date: 08/10/2006 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W4 5 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
08-10-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: valerieb 
Prosecutor: FLATER, AARON W 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROBERT M ARCHULETA 
Video 
Tape Number: cd 45 Tape Count: 1:50 37 
HEARING 
TAPE: Cd 45 COUNT: 1:50 37 
State's witness Mark Nichols sworn and examined 
COUNT: 1:55 5 
cross 
COUNT: 2:09 
City's arguments 
COUNT: 2:11 
Defense closing arguments 
COUNT: 2:14 
the court finds the officer is in the DUI mode, and renders its 
decision as follows: 
there was no probable cause for the officer to pull the defendant 
over, the court finds no evidence for the stop and grants the 
motion to suppress. 
08-10-06 Charge 1 Disposition is Dismissed 
08-10-06 Charge 2 Disposition is Dismissed 
08-10-06 Case Closed 
Disposition Judge is DENNIS M FUCHS 
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